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Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations
Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255514
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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256123
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Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Non, Arjan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010
Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257176
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace
Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257203
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Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin G. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
on the reciprocity of employees. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255473
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Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
This discussion paper resulted in an article in 'Games and Economic Behavior' (2013). Volume 77, issue 1, pages 41-60.<P> Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255890
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Gift Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm
Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
> One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment … in the size of the workforce and intention-based reciprocity rather than social preferences seems to be the main driving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256970
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Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training
Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sloof, Randolph; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002
by reciprocity. A reciprocal worker may be willing to give the firm a full return on its investment. We present empirical … evidence that supports the proposed mechanism. Workers with a high sensitivity to reciprocity have 15% higher training rates … than workers with a low sensitivity to reciprocity.<P>See publication in <A href="http://www3.interscience …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257026
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Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257180
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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256127