We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 2012, 76, 344-348. <P> Three well-known solutions for cooperative TU-games are the Shapley value, the Banzhaf value and the equal division solution. In the literature various axiomatizations of these solutions can be...</p>

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. A difference between the restricted Banzhaf value and the Myerson value (i.e. the Shapley...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>International Journal of Game Theory</I>, 39, 445-466.<P> See also ''An Axiomatization of the Conjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure'', in: Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice (ed. H. de Swart), pp....</p></i>

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Mathematical Methods of Operations Research', 59, 147-166. <P> Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalize the permission structure. So, cooperative games on antimatroids group...</p>

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'TOP' (forthcoming).<P> In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game....</p>

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...

A situation in which a finite set of agents can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply a TU-game) where each agent is represented by one player in the game. In this paper, we assume that one agent can be represented by...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Mathematical Methods of Operations Research', 2013, 77, 1-14.<P> In this paper we provide new axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU-games using axioms that are based on relational aspects in the interactions among players. Some of these...</p>

We consider a cooperative game with a bipartition that indicates which players are participating. This paper provides an analytical solution for the Shapley value when the worth of a coalition only depends on the number of participating coalition players. The computational complexity grows...