This paper resulted in a publication in <A HREF="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191261514000356"><I>Transportation Research Part B: Methodological</I></A> 64, 1-23.<P> This paper analyses optimal coarse tolling of congestion under heterogeneous preferences, and especially the welfare and distributional effects. With coarse tolling, the toll equals a fixed value...</p></i></a>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119013000594"><I>Journal of Urban Economics</I></A>, 2014, 13-27.<P> This paper analyzes efficient pricing at a congested airport dominated by a single firm. Unlike much of the previous literature, we combine a dynamic (bottleneck) model of congestion and a vertical...</p></i></a>

Mohring and Harwitz (1962) showed that, under certain conditions, an optimally designed and priced road would generate user toll revenues just sufficient to cover its capital costs. Several scholars subsequently explored the robustness of that finding. This paper briefly summarizes further...

We compare three stochastic user equilibrium traffic assignment models multinomial probit, nested logit, and generalized nested logit), using a congestible transport network. We test the models in two situations: one in which they have theoretically equivalent coefficients, and one in which they...

In densely-populated countries and in particular in large metropolitan areas, the presence of so much human activity causes all sorts of negative externalities, for example traffic noise disturbance. These externalities call for corrective measures by the government. Economists have developed a...

In Europe, company cars are offered by employers as fringe benefits to their employees at a lower price than employees pay in the car market, mainly due to favourable taxation of company cars. We analyse the welfare effects of favourable taxation of company cars for the Netherlands. The...

Various contributions to the recent literature on congestion pricing have demonstrated that when services at a congestible facility are provided by operators with market power, the case in point often being a few airlines jointly using a congested airport, optimal congestion pricing rules...

We analyse congestion pricing in a road and rail network with heterogeneous users. On the road there is bottleneck congestion. In the train there is crowding congestion. We separately analyse "proportional heterogeneity" that varies the values of time and schedule delay scalarly in fixed...

The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...

This paper studies road safety and accident externalities when insurance companies have market power, and can influence road users' driving behaviour via insurance premiums. We obtain both welfare and profit maximizing marginal conditions for first- and second-best insurance premiums for...