In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform)...

We explore evolutionary dynamics for repeated games with small, but positive complexity costs. To understand the dynamics, we extend a folk theorem result by Cooper (1996) to continuation probabilities, or discount rates, smaller than 1. While this result delineates which payoffs can be...

We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>De Economist</I> (2001). Volume 149, p. 33-51.<P> In this paper the behavior of producers in a social environment is considered from a more sociological point of view than is usually done in economics. The producers play Bertrand price competition...</p></i>

We demonstrate the possibility of shake-out of firms and emergence of inter-firmheterogeneity along the (socially optimal) dynamic equilibrium path of a competitive industry with freeentry and exit, even when there is no uncertainty and all firms are ex ante identical with perfectforesight....

We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection.Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote onthe project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability thatgood decisions are made....

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...