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The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation

Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems … mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this paper we explore the boundary conditions for altruistic punishment to … maintain cooperation by systematically varying the cost and impact of punishment, using a subject pool which extends beyond the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255768

What drives Donor Funding in Population Assistance Programs?

Dalen, Hendrik P. van; Reuser, Mieke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

The 1994 International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) established goals for the expansion of population assistance. This global effort has so far not sufficiently been supported by donor funds. Dynamic panel estimation methods are used to see what lies behind the sharing of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256588

Networks and Collective Action

Flores, Ramon; Koster, Maurice; Lindner, Ines; Molina, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in Social Networks (2012). Vol. 34(4), pages 161-179. This paper proposes a new measure for a group's ability to lead society to adopt their standard of behavior, which in particular takes account of the time the group takes to convince the whole...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256738

Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255939

The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256040

Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

We study antitrust enforcement in which the fine must obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these legal principles into an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model. Bankruptcy considerations ensure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256547

The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256899

Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in Economics Letters, 114, 39-42. Even under antitrust enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. We present a linear oligopoly model where the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257337

Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257358

Seeking Rents in the Shadow of Coase

Dari-Mattiacci, Guiseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

Trade opportunities are generally seen as valuable instruments to improve the allocation of resources in society. However, when the traded rights are secured through unproductive rent-seeking contests, the tradeability of the rents may provide stronger incentives to invest in rent-seeking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255926