Showing 1 - 10 of 122
each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255564
as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a promotion affects both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation significantly …, though in two different ways: An expected promotion increases extrinsic motivation whereas intrinsic motivation is highest … subsequent to a realized promotion. The relationship between extrinsic motivation and expected promotions implies that promotions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257489
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256032
the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment to the job nor their intrinsic motivation. A steep wage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256343
We manipulate workers' perceived meaning of a job in a field experiment. Half of the workers are informed that their … the effect of meaning to the effect of monetary incentives and of worker recognition via symbolic awards. We also look at … interaction effects. While meaning outperforms monetary incentives, the latter have a robust positive effect on performance that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255946
This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256342
This paper reports the results of an individual real effort laboratory experiment where subjects are paid for measured … expectancy theory; noisier performance measures do not lower work motivation.<P>This discussion paper has resulted in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255986
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256322
performance of firms that increase the power of the incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects choose between … (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting high trust or … reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual incentives, workers who chose …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256659
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Economics and Management Strategy', forthcoming.<P> Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to be dysfunctional (gaming). This paper applies the empirical...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257274