Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate spectrum for mobile telecom licenses. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for gaming or strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that CCAs facilitate strategic bidding. Real bidders in...

This paper analyzes empirically whether and if so to what extent later entrants in the European mobile telephony industry have a disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbents and early mover entrants. To analyze this question a dynamic model of market share development and a series of static models are...

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the <I>Journal of Regional Science</I> (2013). Volume 53, Issue 5(SI), pages 855-873.<P> This paper studies the impact of physical distance and different relational proximity types on the formation of the Internet infrastructure. Although there is some...</p></i>

Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bottlenecks which give rise to new questions of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types of asymmetry arising from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation for...

Many networks such as the Internet have been found to possess scale-free and small-world network properties reflected by so-called power law distributions. Scale-free properties evolve in large complex networks through self-organizing processes and more specifically, preferential attachment. New...

Consider a government tendering the right to operate, for example, an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. There is an 'incumbent bidder' who owns a complement or substitute facility, and one entering 'new bidder'. With a 'standard auction' on the payment to the government, the...

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...

If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly...

This discussion paper led to an article in <I>Games and Economic Behavior</I> (2011). Vol. 72, pp. 594-601.<P> There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders...</p></i>

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the <I>Journal of Public Economics</I> (2013). Volume 105, pages 72-85.<P> In a door-to-door fundraising field experiment, we study the impact of fundraising mechanisms on charitable giving. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in either...</p></i>