Similar Search Results

Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256032

Paid to quit

Dur, Robert; Schmittdiel, Heiner - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment to the job nor their intrinsic motivation. A steep wage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256343

Wages and Employment in a Random Social Network with Arbitrary Degree Distribution

Ioannides, Yannis M.; Soetevent, Adriaan R. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

[Ioannides and Loury (2004)]. At the same time, wage differences among workers may be explained only in part by differences in … otherwise identical workers result in wage inequality and differences in unemployment rates. The paper is related to theoretical … wage on average and face a lower unemployment rate. Numerical computations for the specific case in which connections …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255987

Structural Estimation of Search Intensity: Do Non-Employed Workers Search Enough?

Gautier, Pieter A.; Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

as the number of job applications that workers send out. The wage distribution and job search intensities are … simultaneously opening more vacancies and increasing participation. A modest binding minimum wage or conditioning UI benefits on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256974

Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations

Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255514

Competition and Well-Being

Brandts, Jordi; Riedl, Arno; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

We study the effects of competition in a context in which people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that in such an environment the very presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any payoff gains for the short side of the market. We also find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255651

Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations

Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

In many workplaces co-workers have the best information about each other's effort. Managers may attempt to exploit this information through peer evaluation. I study peer evaluation in a pure moral hazard model of production by two limitedly liable agents. Agents receive a signal about their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256614

Endogenous Effort Norms in Hierarchical Firms

Tichem, Jan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

This paper studies how a three-layer hierarchical firm (principal-supervisor-agent) optimally creates effort norms for its employees. The key assumption is that effort norms are affected by the example of superiors. In equilibrium, norms are eroded as one moves down the hierarchy. The reason is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256841

Employee Types and Endogenous Organizational Design

Cunyat, Antoni; Sloof, Randolph - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the 'Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization' (2011). Volume 80, issue 3, pages 553-573.<P> When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256879

The Breakdown of Morale

Vikander, Nick - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

This paper studies how morale in teams can break down. It interprets high morale as team members working together productively, either because of a sense of fairness or because of implicit incentives from repeated interactions. Team members learn that lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256982

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Next
Last