This paper studies an intermediated market operated by middlemen with high inventory holdings. I present a directed search model in which middlemen are less likely to experience a stockout because they have the advantage of inventory capacity, relative to other sellers. The model explains why...

In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted standing to sue for recovery of antitrust damages to direct purchasers. However, antitrust damages are typically (in part) passed on to intermediaries lower in the chain of production and...

This paper presents a model of second-degree price discrimination and inter-group effects to describe the full-service pricing behaviour in the passenger aviation market. Consumer heterogeneity is assumed on both a horizontal and a vertical dimension, while various distinct market structures,...

This paper analyzes the relative economic power position of home carriers in hub-and-spoke systems. Hub-and-spoke systems may lower costs on densely traveled routes and enable economically viable operations on less densely traveled routes. The reverse side is probably that carriers enjoy...

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...

If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly...

This discussion paper led to an article in <I>Games and Economic Behavior</I> (2011). Vol. 72, pp. 594-601.<P> There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders...</p></i>

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the <I>Journal of Public Economics</I> (2013). Volume 105, pages 72-85.<P> In a door-to-door fundraising field experiment, we study the impact of fundraising mechanisms on charitable giving. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in either...</p></i>

A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potential bidders. Every bidder knows his own values over the items and his own budget privately. Due to budget constraint, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values. In such a market, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to...

Consider a government tendering a facility, such as an airport or utility, where one bidder owns a competing facility. With a "standard auction", this "existing operator" bids above the auctioned facility's expected profit, as winning means being a monopolist instead of a duopolist. This auction...