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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
, contractual, and legal solutions. Our results show that auctions (competition among many informed buyers) provide a solution to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256127
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Competition for a Prize
Noll, Rob van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
I present a model in which individuals compete for a prize by choosing to apply or not. Abilities are private information and in attempt to select the best candidate, the committee compares applicants with an imperfect technology. The choice of application cost, size of the prize and use of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255649
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Continuous Time Trading in Markets with Adverse Selection
Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000
We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new buyers and sellers takes place in continuoustime. In thecontinuous time model equilibria with properties that are qualitativelydifferent from thestatic equilibria, emerge....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255809
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Cycles and Multiple Equilibria in the Market for Durable Lemons
Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000
This discussion paper resulted in an article in <I>Economic Theory</I> (2002). Vol. 20, issue 3, pages 579-601.<P> We investigate the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256254
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Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk
Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; Vries, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore reduces the risk of the bank loan portfolio. However, CVaR regulation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257219
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Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection
Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2001
This discussion paper led to a publication in the <I>Journal of Risk and Insurance</I>. Vol. 72(1), pages 45-59.<P> We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257433
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Discrimination in the Labor Market: The Curse of Competition between Workers
Haan, Thomas de; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
evidence for statistical discrimination in the standard no-competition setup of Coate and Loury (1993). When we introduce … competition between workers of different groups, the non-discrimination equilibrium ceases to be stable. In line with this … theoretical observation, we find systematic discrimination in the experimental treatment with competition. Nevertheless, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256510
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Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study
Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur Van de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009
In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255455
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Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations
Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255514
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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Economic Psychology</I>, 31(4), 676-686.<P> We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256123