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In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Smrkolj, Grega; Wagener, Florian - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 5) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256291
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The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009
We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256040
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The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements
Hinloopen, Jeroen - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005
This discussion paper resulted in the publication <I>The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy</I> (2007), 7(1), 1135.<P> Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256731
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The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256899
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Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257358
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Output Commitment through Product Bundling: Experimental Evidence
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Mueller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a first market but competes with another …. Our data indicate support for the theory of product bundling: with bundling and simultaneous moves, the multiproduct firm … better attained with bundling, especially when it chooses to bundle, even though in theory bundling should not make a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256484
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Trust and Recidivism; the Partial Success of Corporate Leniency Program in the Laboratory
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Soetevent, Adriaan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on cartel formation, cartel stability and cartel recidivism. The program leads to lower prices for three reasons. First, non-cooperators are more persistent in their behavior which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257115
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Cooperation in the Classroom: Experimenting with R&D Cooperatives
Goeree, Michelle Sovinsky; Hinloopen, Jeroen - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
This discussion paper resulted in the article <I>Journal of Economic Education</I> (2008), 39(4), 357-373.<P> This paper describes a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256994
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Duopoly Dynamics with a Barrier to Entry
Abbring, Jaap H.; Campbell, Jeffrey R. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite-horizon Markov-perfect duopoly dynamics with ongoing demand uncertainty. All entrants serving the model industry incur sunk costs, and exit avoids future fixed costs. We focus on the unique...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257641
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Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement
Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255939