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Does Campaign Finance imply Political Favors?

Claessens, Stijn; Feijen, Erik; Laeven, Luc - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

This paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions arestrongly associated with market expectations of future firm-specific political favors,including preferential access to external financing. Using a novel dataset, we find thatfirms in Brazil providing contributions in the 1998...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256939

Ranking Systemically Important Financial Institutions

Dungey, Mardi; Luciani, Matteo; Veredas, David - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

. First, Bank of America, JP Morgan and Wells Fargo are consistently in the top 10 throughout the sample. Citigroup and Lehman …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255476

Shadow Banking and Traditional Bank Lending: The Role of Implicit Guarantees

Gornicka, Lucyna - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

Bank holding companies (BHCs) invest in risky projects through bank entities or sell projects for a fee, thus engaging … in shadow banking. BHCs can increase their fee income by guaranteeing sold projects with a recourse to the bank's balance … sheet. When the expected guarantee repayments depend on total bank proceeds (high capital requirements), BHCs have …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256875

The Political Economy of Financial Systems

Haber, Stephen; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms.The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255875

The Political Economy of Financial Fragility

Feijen, Erik; Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255930

Lobbying on Entry

Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In-cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potentialentrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256172

The Political Economy of Finance

Perotti, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

This survey reviews how a recent political economy literature helps explaining variation in governance, competition, funding composition and access to credit. Evolution in political institutions can account for financial evolution, and appear critical to explain rapid changes in financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256233

Investor Protection and Entry

Perotti, Enrico; Volpin, Paolo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256887

On Risk, Leverage and Banks: Do highly Leveraged Banks take on Excessive Risk?

Koudstaal, Martin; Wijnbergen, Sweder van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

This paper deals with the relation between excessive risk taking and capital structure in banks. Examining a quarterly dataset of U.S. banks between 1993 and 2010, we find that equity is valued higher when more risky portfolios are chosen when leverage is high, and that more risk taking has a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257139

Does Competition make Banks more Risk-seeking?

Arping, Stefan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

This article presents a model in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, competi- tion can make banks more reluctant to take excessive risks: As competition intensifies and margins decline, banks face more-binding threats of failure, to which they may respond by reducing their risk-taking. Yet,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255642

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