We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they...

Various contributions to the recent literature on congestion pricing have demonstrated that when services at a congestible facility are provided by operators with market power, the case in point often being a few airlines jointly using a congested airport, optimal congestion pricing rules...

The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...

This paper studies road safety and accident externalities when insurance companies have market power, and can influence road users' driving behaviour via insurance premiums. We obtain both welfare and profit maximizing marginal conditions for first- and second-best insurance premiums for...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Urban Economics</I> (2004). Volume 55, pages 257-277.<P> Conventional economic wisdom suggests that congestion pricing would be an appropriate response to cope with the growing congestion levels currently experienced at many airports....</p></i>

The famous Mohring-Harwitz theorem states that, under certain technical conditions, the degree of self-financing of congested infrastructure is equal to the elasticity of the capacity cost function in the optimum, so that under neutral scale economies exact self-financing applies. Although the...

We analyze the phenomenon of hub dominance by developing a model relating faresto distance, using the mainleg of intercontinental flights for scaling purposes. Our results indicate thatat least some of the major Europeancarriers place a mark up on flights originating from or going to their hubs.

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069611001380">'Journal of Environmental Economics and Management'</A>.<p>Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints....</p></a>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Economic Journal</I> (2014). Volume 124, pages 887-916.<P> In the process of regulatory reform in the electric power industry, the mitigation of market power is one of the basic problems regulators have to deal with. We use experimental data to...</p></i>

Building on a model of the interaction of risk-averse frms that compete in forward and spot markets, we develop an empirical strategy to test whether oligopolistic frms use forward contracts for strategic motives, for risk-hedging, or for both. An increase in the number of players weakens the...