In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform)...

We explore evolutionary dynamics for repeated games with small, but positive complexity costs. To understand the dynamics, we extend a folk theorem result by Cooper (1996) to continuation probabilities, or discount rates, smaller than 1. While this result delineates which payoffs can be...

We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>De Economist</I> (2001). Volume 149, p. 33-51.<P> In this paper the behavior of producers in a social environment is considered from a more sociological point of view than is usually done in economics. The producers play Bertrand price competition...</p></i>

This discussion paper has resulted in a chapter in: (R.U. Ayres, D. Simpson, and M. Toman (eds.)), Scarcity and Growth in the Millennium, 2005, Resources for the Future, Washington DC, 177-97.

Economic theories of managing renewable resources, such as fisheries and forestry, traditionally assume that individual harvesters are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the harvesting strategy that maximizes their discounted profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach...