This discussion paper led to an article in <I>Games and Economic Behavior</I> (2011). Vol. 72, pp. 594-601.<P> There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders...</p></i>

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</I> (2008), volume 66, pages 243-250.<P> We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to testvarious models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and...</p></i>

This discussion paper led to a publication in the <I>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</I> (2010). Vol. 166, issue 2, pages 286-298. <P> A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple objects, in which bidders simultaneously express a...</p></i>

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825611001151">'Games and Economic Behavior'</A>, 74(1), 399-406. <P>The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this...</p></a>

See the article with the same title in the 'Economic Journal' (2003), 113, 598-614.<p> The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper...</p>

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Consider a government tendering the right to operate, for example, an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. There is an 'incumbent bidder' who owns a complement or substitute facility, and one entering 'new bidder'. With a 'standard auction' on the payment to the government, the...