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The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments

Clougherty, Joseph A.; Seldeslachts, Jo - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

(5), pages 1114-1144.<P> We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect tothe composition and … frequency of future merger notifications. Data from the Annual Reports bythe U.S. DOJ and FTC allow industry based measures over …. We find the challenge-rate to robustly deter future horizontal(both relative and absolute) merger activity; the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257501

Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement

Bhaskarabhatla, Ajay; Pennings, Enrico - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a monopolist facinguncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensivedisclosures and patents by IBM during 1955-1989. Our results indicate that strongerantitrust enforcement leads to more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257572

Quantifying the Scope for Efficiency Defense in Merger Control: The Werden-Froeb-Index

Goppelsroeder, Marie; Schinkel, Maarten Pieter; … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006

This paper introduces the Werden-Froeb Index (WFI) to assist in evaluating merger-specific efficiencies in horizontal … mergers. The index measures the weighted average reduction in marginal costs required to restore pre-merger equilibrium prices … and quantities after the (full or partial) merger is consummated. The WFI is well defined, objective and robust, and it …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257357

Defining European Wholesale Electricity Markets: An “And/Or” Approach

Dijkgraaf, Elbert; Janssen, Maarten C.W. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

An important question in the dynamic European wholesale markets for electricity is whether to define the geographical market at the level of an individual member state or more broadly. We show that if we currently take the traditional approach by considering for each member state whether there...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255814

Tax Competition under Minimum Rates: The Case of European Diesel Excises

Evers, Michiel; Mooij, Ruud A. de; Vollebergh, Herman R.J. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors’ tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255686

Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition

Vrijburg, Hendrik; Mooij, Ruud A. de - Tinbergen Instituut - 2010

This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261936

Tax Rates as Strategic Substitutes

Mooij, Ruud A. de; Vrijburg, Hendrik - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

This paper analytically derives the conditions under which the slope of the tax reaction function is negative in a classical tax competition model. If countries maximize welfare, we show that a negative slope (reflecting strategic substitutability) occurs under relatively mild conditions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256822

Prospects for an EMU between Federalism and Nationalism

Butter, Frank A.G. den; Segers, Mathieu L.L. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014

Which ways and means are available for the macroeconomic and fiscal coordination and/or integration within the EMU-framework? Which are the pros and cons of these scenarios? This paper combines economic theory, empirical analysis and insights regarding EMU’s institutional history in order to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257477

Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255939

The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256040