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cooperation and sanctioning', 2007, <I>KritV - Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft</I>, 90, 1 … difference between them concerns the question of “who punishes”. In the first approach, punishment is executed by the group … members themselves individually, i.e., punishment is decentral in nature. The second approach is based on the idea that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256917
anger, ‘social’ emotions like shame and guilt need to be present for punishment to be an effective deterrent of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256568
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>Structural Change and Economic Dynamics</I>, 2013, 24, 141-156.<P> We address the notion of dynamic, endogenous diversity and its role in theories of investment and technological innovation. We develop a formal model of an innovation arising from the...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255510
Evolutionary and environmental economics have a potentially close relationship. This paper reviews past and identifies potential applications of evolutionary concepts and methods to environmental economics. This covers a number of themes: resource use and ecosystem management; growth and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256552
The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255513
We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255692
We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255823
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary conditions that allow us to characterize Markov perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE) for these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255863
We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255939
We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best reply versus the opponent's previous action. From simulations it appears that each learning strategy will be used, because each performs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255959