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(1), 1135.<P> Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256731
The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249545
We develop a method to screen for local cartels. We first test whether there is statistical evidence of clustering of outlets that score high on some characteristic that is consistent with collusive behavior. If so, we determine in a second step the most suspicious regions where further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255447
To account for the illegal nature of price-fixing agreements, detection probabilities are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly. It follows that for a trigger strategy to sustain a non-cooperative collusive equilibrium as a SPNE both the discount rate and all per-period detection probabilities have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255811
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>European Economic Review</I> (2014), 164-180.<P> We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a first market but competes with another firm in a second market. We compare treatments where the...</p></i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256484
An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257580
We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256040
We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model where the fine rates are linked to illegal gains and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. A novel aspect of this study is that we focus on the worst possible outcome. We investigate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256899
For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257358
We illustrate the impact of detailed data in empirical economic research by considering how the increased data availability has changed the scope and focus of studies on retail gasoline pricing. We show how high-volume, high-frequency price data help to identify and explain long-term trends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261928