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Endogenous Effort Norms in Hierarchical Firms
Tichem, Jan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
This paper studies how a three-layer hierarchical firm (principal-supervisor-agent) optimally creates effort norms for its employees. The key assumption is that effort norms are affected by the example of superiors. In equilibrium, norms are eroded as one moves down the hierarchy. The reason is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256841
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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We test … more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256123
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The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Verbeke, Willem - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
We conduct a field experiment in a large retail chain to test basic predictions of tournament theory regarding prize … the distribution of prize money across winners of the first and second round of the tournament. As predicted by theory, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256723
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Wage Structure and the Incentive Effect of Promotions
Herpen, Marco van; Cools, Kees; Praag, Mirjam van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
as a wage determinant. We furthermore show that a promotion affects both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation significantly …, though in two different ways: An expected promotion increases extrinsic motivation whereas intrinsic motivation is highest … subsequent to a realized promotion. The relationship between extrinsic motivation and expected promotions implies that promotions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257489
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Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri; Verbeke, Willem - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009
tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257323
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256032
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Paid to quit
Dur, Robert; Schmittdiel, Heiner - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256343
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A Field Experiment in Motivating Employee Ideas
Neckermann, Susanne; Gibbs, Michael; Siemroth, Christoph - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
We study the effects of a field experiment designed to motivate employee ideas, at a large technology company. Employees were encouraged to submit ideas on process and product improvements via an online system. In the experiment, the company randomized 19 account teams into treatment and control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272603
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On the Merits of Meritocracy
Morgan, John; Sisak, Dana; Vardy, Felix - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in … attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the … hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255815
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Biased Supervision
Delfgaauw, Josse; Souverijn, Michiel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
When verifiable performance measures are imperfect, organizations often resort to subjective performance pay. This may give supervisors the power to direct employees towards tasks that mainly benefit the supervisor rather than the organization. We cast a principal-supervisor-agent model in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257408