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Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up

Allain, Marie-Laure; Rey, Patrick; Chambolle, Claire - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2014

While vertical integration is traditionally seen as a solution to the hold-up problem, this paper highlights instead that it can generate hold-up problems — for rivals. We first consider a successive duopoly where competition among suppliers eliminates any risk of hold-up; downstreamfirms thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004742

When Is Building a Library Consortium Benecial?

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2013

This paper identifies strategies to build a library consortium from a long term point of view. Contrary to the conventional wisdom to build a consortium around groups of homogenous institutions (Davis, 2002), we find that libraries with similar preferences are likely to lose from building a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004747

Mass Retailers’ Advertising Strategies Faced with Different Competitor Store Formats: Commodity Stores or Hard Discounts.

Bergès, Fabian; Monier-Dilhan, Sylvette - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2012

This article analyzes the effects of international trade policies on an imperfect competitive domestic market, taking into account not only consumers but also upstream and downstream firms. We first study the impact of a classic import tax decrease and we find that upstream firms are harmed and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651487

Vertical Integration, Information and Foreclosure

Allain, Marie-Laure; Chambolle, Claire; Rey, Patrick - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369323

Loss Leading as an Exploitative Practice

Rey, Patrick; Chen, Zhijun - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2010

Large retailers, enjoying substantial market power in some local markets, often compete with smaller retailers who carry a narrower range of products in a more efficient way. We find that these large retailers can exercise their market power by adopting a loss-leading pricing strategy, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369331

Dominance and Competitive Bundling

Hurkens, Sjaak; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2013

We study bundling by a dominant multi-product firm facing competition from a rival multi-product firm. Compared to competition under independent pricing, competition under pure bundling reduces (increases) each firm's profit for low (high) levels of dominance, while for intermediate levels of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010714020

Cooperation vs. Collusion: How Essentiality Shapes Co-opetition

Rey, Patrick; Tirole, Jean - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2013

The paper makes two related contributions. First, and in contrast with the rich body of literature on collusion with (mainly perfect) substitutes, it derives general results on the sustainability of tacit coordination for a class of nested demand functions that allows for the full range between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823124

Competitive Cross-Subsidization

Chen, Zhijun; Rey, Patrick - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2013

This paper analyzes competitive pricing policies by multiproduct firms facing heterogeneous buying patterns. We show that cross-subsidization arises when firms have comparative advantages on different products but are equally efficient overall: Firms earn a profit from multi-stop shoppers by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823137

Welfare Tradeoffs in U.S. Rail Mergers

Ivaldi, Marc; Mccullough, Gerard - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2010

The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008764505

Prosecution and Leniency Programs: a Fool's Game

Sauvagnat, Julien - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2010

cartel. In this context, the Antitrust Authority may obtain cartel members' confessions even when it opens an investigation … conviction rate, which in turn enhances cartel desistance and cartel deterrence. A second contribution of the paper is to show … that the optimal leniency scheme involves a single informant rule. That is, amnesty should be given only if a unique cartel …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008643937