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The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe - UCLA Department of Economics - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359174
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Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types
Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005359192
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Inefficiencies in Bargaining: Departing from Akerlof and Myerson-Satterthwaite
Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe - UCLA Department of Economics - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708412
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Bargaining over Randomly Generated Offers: A new Perspective on Multi-Party Bargaining
Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe - UCLA Department of Economics - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572838
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Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?
Compte, Olivier; Jehiel, Philippe - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572892
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Rationality of Belief
Gilboa, Itzhak; Postlewaite, Andrew; Schmeidler, David - UCLA Department of Economics - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248597
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Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts
Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry; Silverman, Dan - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708357
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - UCLA Department of Economics - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827904
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Probabilities in Economic Modeling
Gilboa, Itzhak; Postlewaite, Andrew; Schmeidler, David - UCLA Department of Economics - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827971
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Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games
McLean, Rich; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - UCLA Department of Economics - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828001