We consider the “and” communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication...

We propose two classes of allocation games for N.T.U. and T.U. exchange economies in which initial endowments and preferences depend on the agents’ private information. In both models, agents make non-verifiable claims about their types and effective deposits of consumption goods, which are...

We consider a simple model of lending and borrowing combining two informational problems: adverse selection and costly state verification. Our analysis highlights the interaction between these two informational problems. We notably show that the higher the monitoring cost, the less...

This is a summary of the author’s Ph.D. thesis supervised by Fioravante Patrone and Stefano Bonassi and defended on 25 May 2006 at the Università degli Studi di Genova. The thesis in written in English and a copy is available from the author upon request. This work deals with the discussion...

Le coeur ex ante incitatif d'une économie d'échange en information incomplète est le coeur, au sens de la théorie des jeux coopératifs standard, d'une fonction caractéristique qui rend compte du fait que les coalitions allouent les biens grâce à des mécanismes aléatoires incitatifs....

Dans les débats sur la zone Euro et son élargissement, l’accent est souvent mis sur le problème de l’hétérogénéité entre les pays. Mais les difcultés à se coordonner ne provi- ennent pas nécessairement de la disparité entre les pays, tout au moins si le nombre de pays est...