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In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493427
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024339
When an incumbent firm is in charge of a distribution network, it accumulates information on the state of the network. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality contracting out the provision of the service trades off...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008551706
Nous étudions l'impact des participations au capital sur les enchères à valeurs privées indépendantes. Le revenu de l'enchère décroît lorsque les acheteurs ont des participations croisées et croît lorsqu'ils détiennent une partie du capital du vendeur. Dans tous les cas de...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790072
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543994
Conflicts of interest are the inherent price to pay to benefit from information synergies offered by multiple financial service providers. We focus on conflicts faced by a investment bank's "guru" sell-side analyst, which is torn between the pro-investor research department favoring fair...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529667
This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532318
This paper characterizes geometrically the sets of all Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002742
Cette étude exploratoire porte sur les liens existant entre degré d'abstraction des labels, valeurs hédoniques et utilitaires de la visite d’un site Web et satisfaction du consommateur par rapport à l’environnement d’achat. L'analyse des entretiens montre que cette satisfaction varie...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008504543
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008520023