We characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when borrowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default...

This Paper analyses the effect of a possible takeover on information flows and on the terms of trade in business relationships. We consider a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately-informed stakeholder, a buyer for example. In our model, takeovers both increase the surplus from...

Nous établissons dans cet article des résultats de dualité, d’existence et d’unicité pour une classe de problèmes de transport optimal de masse. La nouveauté réside ici dans l’emploi de la transformée de Fenchel h-convexe qui permet d’utiliser un argument de W. Gangbo [9]...

In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts. Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a sufficiently high risk aversion implies that the optimal...

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can...

This paper explores the relationship between dynamic consistency and existing notions of unambiguous events for Choquet expected utility preferences. A decision maker is faced with an information structure represented by a filtration. We show that the decision maker’s preferences respect...

Since the seminal paper of Ghirardato, it is known that Fubini Theorem for non-additive measures can be available only for functions defined as “slice-comonotonic”. We give different assumptions that provide such Fubini Theorems in the framework of product σ-algebras.

We study imperfect competition between insurers in a multiple-risk environment. In the absence of asymmetric information, equilibria are efficient, and we determine the degrees of specialization under which the specialized insurers are able or unable to capture the surplus. We show in contrast...

We analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers. We show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage. This explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments...

This paper provides an existence theorem for a class of infinite-dimensional non-convex problems arising in symmetric and asymmetric information models. Sufficient conditions for monotonicity of solutions are also given. The proofs are very simple and rely on rearrangement techniques and the...