We develop a dynamic model in which traders have differential information about the payoff of the risky asset and trade the risky asset with proportional transaction costs. Firstly, trading volume provides useful information on the asset fundamental value which cannot be inferred from the...

We analyze the link between pessimism and risk-aversion. We consider a model of partially revealing, competitive rational expectations equilibrium with diverse information, in which the distribution of risk-aversion across individuals is unknown. We show that when a high individual level of...

We study, in the framework of Back [Rev. Financial Stud. 5(3), 387–409 (1992)], an equilibrium model for the pricing of a defaultable zero coupon bond issued by a firm. The market consists of a risk-neutral informed agent, noise traders, and a market maker who sets the price using the total...

This paper explores the relationship between dynamic consistency and existing notions of unambiguous events for Choquet expected utility preferences. A decision maker is faced with an information structure represented by a filtration. We show that the decision maker’s preferences respect...

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can...

Since the seminal paper of Ghirardato, it is known that Fubini Theorem for non-additive measures can be available only for functions defined as “slice-comonotonic”. We give different assumptions that provide such Fubini Theorems in the framework of product σ-algebras.

When an incumbent firm is in charge of a distribution network, it accumulates information on the state of the network. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality contracting out the provision of the service trades off...

Radner (1968) proved existence of a competitive equilibrium for differential information economies with finitely many states. We extend this result to economies with infinitely many states of nature. Each agent observes a public and a private signal. The publicly observed signal may take...

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irre- ducible economy has...