Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent companies from profiting from insider information. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a...

We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long term relationships between the target owners and other stakeholders. In the absence of takeovers, stakeholders’ bargaining power increases their incentive to invest but reduces the owners’ incentive to invest. The threat of a takeover that...

This study investigates whether European domestic GAAPs used for intangibles recognition prior to the IFRS adoption exhibit major differences while examining the relationship between a firm's economic (financial, operating and competitive) performance and its recognized intangible investment...

Résumé: Motivée par les récents travaux de Lev [2001b ; 2004] et les débats actuels de l’IASB portant sur la traduction comptable de l’investissement immatériel (ci-après IIM), cette étude empirique pose la question de l’utilité de l’information comptable face à de tels...

Cet article porte sur les transformations en cours du corporate governance au Japon, domaine d'observation privilégié de la crise nippone au cours de la décennie quatre-vingt-dix. Ce travail s'inscrit dans un courant plus large de travaux cherchant à analyser la transition d'un système de...

We investigate the link between the regulation of control transactions and the institutional and corporate features of public companies, by analyzing the massive delisting activity in the Romanian capital market. The peculiar ownership reforms involving a large number of listed companies offer a...

Dans le cadre théorique du gouvernement d'entreprise, cet article étudie l'efficacité du contrôle exercé par la structure de propriété et le conseil d'administration sur les dirigeants. La confrontation des théories de l'enracinement et de l'agence permet de déterminer les conditions...

We examine the relation between cash holdings, quality of governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights hold more cash, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between governance...

Research on the impact of open market share repurchases has been hindered by the lack of data available on actual share repurchases in many countries, including the US. Using a previously unused database containing detailed information on 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French firms, we show that...

French law mandates that employees of large publicly listed companies be allowed to elect two types of directors to represent employees. First, partially privatized companies must reserve two or three (depending on board size) board seats for directors elected by employees by right of...