Using a sample of acquisitions of unlisted firms completed by public companies from 17 Western European countries over the period 2003-2008, this study investigates whether private equity (PE)-backing of acquired firms has an impact on announcement period abnormal returns to acquirers. 12.5% of...

Dans le cadre théorique du gouvernement d'entreprise, cet article étudie l'efficacité du contrôle exercé par la structure de propriété et le conseil d'administration sur les dirigeants. La confrontation des théories de l'enracinement et de l'agence permet de déterminer les conditions...

Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately held firms, such as joint ventures and venture capital-backed companies. We provide an economic explanation for key clauses in such agreements—namely, put and call options, tag-along and drag-along rights, demand and...

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure...

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure...

La lecture des rapports annuels 1998 et 1999 des sociétés du CAC 40, guidée par un dictionnaire des thèmes en rapport avec le gouvernement d’entreprise et la création de valeur, montre l’évolution considérable de la communication financière. Cinq catégories de sociétés supportant...

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. Such agreements are often viewed as means of insulating the firm from the market for corporate control. Specific provisions (namely concerted action, pre-emptive buying rights and repartitioning...

This paper considers an international sample of venture capital and private equity funds to assess the role of law, corruption and culture in setting fund manager fees in terms of their fixed management fees, carried interest performance fees, clawbacks of fees and cash versus share...

In this theoretical paper, I examine bargaining over the financial terms of a contract between an entrepreneur willing to realize a project and a supportive financier such as a venture capitalist. I study the impact of the endogenous opportunity to resort to non-supportive financiers such as...

This paper explores the relationship between venture capitalists (VCs)’ financial contracts and the characteristics of these VCs. Analyzing VCs' responses to our questionnaire, we find that VCs’ contractual behaviors differ according to affiliation and experience. VCs working for independent...