We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mechanism, allows agents to...

When rational but myopic agents negotiate over the exchange of indivisible resources, any restriction to the negotiation protocol may prevent the system from converging to a socially optimal allocation in the general case. This paper addresses this issue by analysing how the confinement to...

This note analyzes some properties of optional two-part pricing in a two-type economy. First, the optimal contracts along the Paretian frontier are described. Then, the duality relation between the Rawlsian program and the discriminating monopoly is demonstrated. Last, this property is used to...

The standard literature on the value of life relies on Yaari’s (1965) model, which includes an implicit assumption of risk neutrality with respect to life duration. To overpass this limitation, we extend the theory to a simple variety of nonadditively separable preferences. The enlargement we...

Nous proposons dans cet article une analyse critique du classement mondial des universités publié chaque année par l’Institut de l’Enseignement supérieur de l’Université Jiao Tong de Shangaï et plus connu sous le nom de « classement de Shangaï ». Après avoir rappelé comment le...

Multiagent resource allocation is a timely and exciting area of research at the interface of Computer Science and Eco- nomics. One of the main challenges in this area is the high complexity of negotiation. In particular, the complexity of the task of identifying rational deals, i.e. deals that...

We study, in the framework of Back [Rev. Financial Stud. 5(3), 387–409 (1992)], an equilibrium model for the pricing of a defaultable zero coupon bond issued by a firm. The market consists of a risk-neutral informed agent, noise traders, and a market maker who sets the price using the total...

This paper characterizes geometrically the sets of all Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first...