We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly...

We characterize the minmax values of a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-off for the team formed by punishing players between optimization of stage-payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation. Amounts of correlation are...

We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro (whence the name “minority game”). The players in the same...

We consider two-person undiscounted repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling and prove the existence of a "joint plan" uniform equilibrium.

We give new proofs of existence of the limit of the discounted values for two person zero-sum games in the following frameworks: incomplete information, absorbing, recursive. The idea of these new proofs is to use some comparison criteria.

We consider repeated game forms with incomplete information and state dependent signalling structure. We study the information a player can learn about the state of nature through a communication procedure, in a way robust to unilateral deviations. More precisely, we say that player i can...

We study the existence of uniform equilibria for three-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and perfect observation. If there are only two states of nature, a completely revealing or a joint plan equilibrium always exists. This is not the case for larger spaces of states.

We consider the asymptotic value of two person zero sum repeated games with general evaluations of the stream of stage payoffs. We show existence for incomplete information games, splitting games and absorbing games. The technique of proof consists in embedding the discrete repeated game into a...

The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...