Showing 1 - 10 of 52
In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of entrenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861596
Profit manipulation has been largely studied through Positive Accounting Theory (PAT). However, the weakness of the results obtained would suggest using different theoretical and methodological approaches to examine this subject. In France, management controllers play a central role in profit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905207
Including real options in firms ’ value raises numerous difficulties. Limitations concerning the relevance of option pricing models outside financial markets are the most salient, but carrying out a valuation implies other assumptions, especially on firms’ governance. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905233
This paper aims to examine the effect of many ownership features on firm's disclosure quality using the theoretical framework of the agency theory, which states that investors information demand increases with agency costs of the firm. Public ownership increases agency costs and therefore should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905388
Social responsibility standards voluntarily set by a company create obligations both in respect of their issuers and their receptors. Law operates a double movement of legalization (they shall become binding for employees) and control (this binding nature is to exist only if it satisfies the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905441
Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790025
Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790035
Today’s unstable and unpredictable world, from a financial and a legal point of view, creates a new requirement, the performance. In this context, the company’s legal performance refers to its ability of develop legal resources and to connect it to other resources to reach its goals,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010795041
This paper analyses the private equity fund compensation. We build a model to estimate the expected revenue of fund managers as a function of their investor contracts. We tried to evaluate the present value of the carried interest, which is one of the most common profit sharing arrangements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010799301
This research examines the relationship between corporate governance in Lebanon and performance in financially economically distressed companies. Working under the auspices of agency theory assumption that decline is a situation where deteriorating performance exemplifies the deviation in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010772259