A firm chooses a price and the product information it discloses to a consumer whose tastes are privately known. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the match function for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium outcome whatever the costs and prior beliefs about product and...

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups benefit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of...

Informed insurance monopoly and risk discrimination We model a situation where a monopolistic insurer is better at evaluating riski­ness than the policyholders. We characterize the equilibria of the corresponding multidimensional signaling game. We compare the predictions with those of adverse...

We analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers. We show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage. This explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments...

In this note, we intend to characterize conditions such that adverse selection is irrelevant in health insurance. We show that a condition is that policyholders health status is sufficiently reduced by illness.

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can...