Public statistics face quite a challenge when it comes to measuring new dimensions of development (institutions, governance, and social and political participation). To take up this challenge, modules on Governance, Democracy and Multiple Dimensions of Poverty have been appended to household...

This Bayesian modeling book is intended for practitioners and applied statisticians looking for a self-contained entry to computational Bayesian statistics. Focusing on standard statistical models and backed up by discussed real datasets available from the book website, it provides an...

Strategy is made of moves, counter-moves, adjustments, actions and reactions. It is founded on an ever-changing external and internal context where numerous actors continuously modify the rules of the game. In these contexts, managers can’t rely on effective planned processes. They have to...

Capitalizing on the company’s crucial knowledge is an important operation for company’s success. The first step in knowledge capitalizing is to identify the crucial knowledge for which capitalizing operation is required. The crucial knowledge identification is an ill-structured and...

Winner of the 2004 DeGroot Prize This paperback edition, a reprint of the 2001 edition, is a graduate-level textbook that introduces Bayesian statistics and decision theory. It covers both the basic ideas of statistical theory, and also some of the more modern and advanced topics of Bayesian...

This graduate-level textbook is the translation into French of The Bayesian Choice (Springer 2001). It presents an introduction to Bayesian statistics and decision theory. Its scope covers both the basic ideas of statistical theory, and also some of the more modern and advanced topics of...

Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needsto reach a common position on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one....

This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored...