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This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two types of shareholdings are analyzed: vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds cover situations in which bidders own a fraction of the seller's profit (resp: a share of their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706883
In this paper we review contracting issues raised by a government’s decision to contract out activities linked to public services, as well as highlighting potential future research avenues. We first review the different kinds of contracting arrangements and public private partnerships used by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011072497
The article offers an illustration of the respective role of institutions and contracts and their interactions in the coordination process of contracting parties, drawing upon an empirical analysis of defense procurement contracts in France. The articles seeks to provide an explanation of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708714
We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms – the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA) – in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011162127
We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166392
We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166430
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861481
We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861510
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861605
Nous considérons la vente aux enchères sous pli scellé au second prix d'un objet que chaque acquéreur potentiel évalue de manière « privée et indépendante ». Nous montrons que l'optimum ex ante d'un cartel, sous contraintes d'incitation et d'équilibre ex post des transferts, coïncide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074225