We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and...

For any TU game and any ranking of players, the set of all preimputations compatible with the ranking, equipped with the Lorenz order, is a bounded join semi-lattice. Furthermore, the set admits as sublattice the S-Lorenz core intersected with the region compatible with the ranking. This result...

In a committee where cooperative voting occurs, effectivity functions describe the blocking power of coalitions. It is a binary relation that says for each coalition T and each subset of outcomes B whether or not T can force the final outcome within B. The corresponding cooperative stability...

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

Traditionally, cooperative game theory has been applied to a variety of water resource problems assuming a deterministic pattern of supply. On the other hand, in view of the important role that water plays in regional and local projects, and taking into account that with climate change affecting...

In a hedonic game the preference relation of each player is defined on the set of coalitions that contain the player. The paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for core-partition existence in a hedonic game. The condition is based on a new concept of balancedness, called pivotal...

We investigate the relative efficiency of an agreement based on a uniform standard without transfers and one based on differentiated standards with transfers when strictly identical countries deal with transboundary pollution. We especially ask what role fixed cost plays. Two approaches are...

The interpretation of gene interaction in biological networks generates the need for a meaningful ranking of network elements. We introduce a new approach using coalitional games to evaluate the centrality of genes in networks keeping into account genes interactions. The Shapley value for...

The goal of this work is to provide a comprehensive review of different Game Theory applications that have been recently used to predict the behavior of non-rational agents in interaction situations arising from computational biology. In the first part of the paper, we focus on evolutionary...