When countries decide to coordinate and form a coalition, an outsider country can take advantage of the situation and gain more than an insider, hence creating a free-rider problem that could threaten the stability of the coalition. But as far as the Euro zone is concerned, the emphasis put on...

Dans les débats sur la zone Euro et son élargissement, l’accent est souvent mis sur le problème de l’hétérogénéité entre les pays. Mais les difcultés à se coordonner ne provi- ennent pas nécessairement de la disparité entre les pays, tout au moins si le nombre de pays est...

Using a four-country Mundell–Fleming model including portfolio and wealth effects, we explore the question whether some types of policy coordination could improve the outcomes of a financial shock like the Asian crisis. Time-consistent equilibria are computed : a Nash equilibrium, a target...

The housing market is a central macroprudential policy concern in France due to the significant proportion of residential property loans in bank balance sheets and the high weight of housing in household wealth. The surge in house prices at the start of the 2000s means we cannot rule out the...

This paper considers the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on the optimal level of public debt. Households are subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk and insurance market imperfectness prevents them from from fully insuring against risk. We find that the optimal level of public debt...

We extend the model of Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) to the case of a monetary union. Within a two-country dynamic model with wealth private behaviours, we study the implications of stabilising public debt on monetary and fiscal policies. The model is a macroeconomic version of the Fiscal Theory...

According to the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies with governments facing the possibility to act in a non-Ricardian manner make the general price level be fully determined. Here, depending on the expectations framework, we show to...