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Auctions and shareholdings
Ettinger, David - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2008
This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706883
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Online Reverse Auctions Use and the Dance of Trust: Maintaining or Deteriorating Relationships
Josserand, Emmanuel; Charki, Mohamed Hédi - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2007
This research explores the effect of the introduction of online reverse auctions (ORAs) on interorganizational trust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708559
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Online Reverse Auctions Use and the Dance of Trust: Maintaining or Deteriorating Relationships
Charki, Mohamed Hédi; Josserand, Emmanuel - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2008
This research explores the effect of the introduction of online reverse auctions (ORAs) on interorganizational trust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708623
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Optimal concession of water services under common value
Salanié, François; Bontems, Philippe; Aubert, Cécile - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2006
. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality … designed to address this difficulty, with asymmetric auctions in which the incumbent is favored and increasing output schedules …. Contrary to standard auctions, the winner's curse can be prevented at no expected cost. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708683
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Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
Ettinger, David - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2003
We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861510
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Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
Orzach, Ram; Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2011
In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708636
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Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
Forges, Françoise; Biran, Omer - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2011
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708853
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Bidding among friends and enemies with symmetric information
Ettinger, David - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2010
We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166430
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Financial Markets with Heterogeneous Beliefs
Jouini, Elyès; Napp, Clotilde - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905321
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Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
Renault, Jérôme; Tomala, Tristan - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004
The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708402