Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...

This paper analyses the private equity fund compensation. We build a model to estimate the expected revenue of fund managers as a function of their investor contracts. We tried to evaluate the present value of the carried interest, which is one of the most common profit sharing arrangements...

This research examines the relationship between corporate governance in Lebanon and performance in financially economically distressed companies. Working under the auspices of agency theory assumption that decline is a situation where deteriorating performance exemplifies the deviation in...

In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of entrenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the...

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. Such agreements are often viewed as means of insulating the firm from the market for corporate control. Specific provisions (namely concerted action, pre-emptive buying rights and repartitioning...

In this article, the author inverses the traditional approach (does corporate governance favour innovation?) considering how innovation influences corporate governance in the European telecommunication sector.

The reading of CAC 40 annuals reports on 1998 and 1999, based on a themes’ dictionary connected with corporate governance and shareholder value, shows evolution of financial communication. Five groups of firms which support a different shareholder influence are distinguished.

Controlled firms are in a framework where private benefits create a buffer between public earnings and economic profitability. We focus on debt leverage in the type II agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and outside investors. We use a simple discrete model comparing the capital...