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This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two types of shareholdings are analyzed: vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds cover situations in which bidders own a fraction of the seller's profit (resp: a share of their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706883
When an incumbent firm is in charge of a distribution network, it accumulates information on the state of the network. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality contracting out the provision of the service trades off...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708683
one dollar and thirty cents to senders in the two trials of the experiment. Potential gains for senders could be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115220
The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708402
communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex ante) outperform delegation. Referring to multiple experts allow the decision …-maker to obtain more information. However, this information can never be perfect, and sophisticated communication games, for … instance with multilateral, multistage communication, do not outperform simple communication methods. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166548
concepts, we conduct a dynamic extension of Ellsbergʼs 3-color experiment. We find that more subjects act in line with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073068
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We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.
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