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La répartition des droits de vote, leur exercice et l’efficacité économique
Hamon, Jacques - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2001
This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems in Europe. One share-one vote encourages the selection of an efficient management team. Families are the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707890
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Efficacité des structures de contrôle et enracinement des dirigeants
Alexandre, Hervé; Paquerot, Mathieu - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2000
In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of entrenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861596
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Développements récents dans la gouvernance d’entreprises
Ginglinger, Edith - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905148
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Debt, Private Benefits, and Corporate Governance: An Analysis in an Option Valuation Framework
de La Bruslerie, Hubert - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2014
self-regulation mechanism may develop even in the situation of control by a dominant shareholder. The joint questions of … with a no private benefit case. When debt exceeds a certain threshold point, it becomes strongly disciplinary. Thus, a self-regulation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790025
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Ownership Structure and Debt Leverage: Empirical Test of a Trade-Off Hypothesis on French Firms
de La Bruslerie, Hubert; Latrous, Imen - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2012
Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790035
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Do target shareholder agreements induce bidders to pay higher premiums?
Belot, François - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2009
takeovers. Using a sample of French deals, this paper investigates the impact of shareholder agreements on takeover premiums. A … shareholder agreement is in force in 27.1% of target companies. A positive relationship between shareholder pacts and takeover … existence of a shareholder agreement. This finding suggests that shareholder pacts dramatically increase the negotiating power …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706570
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Ownership structure, debt, and private benefits in controlled firms
de La Bruslerie, Hubert - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2011
Controlled firms are in a framework where private benefits create a buffer between public earnings and economic profitability. We focus on debt leverage in the type II agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and outside investors. We use a simple discrete model comparing the capital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707651
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Ownership structure and debt leverage: Empirical test of a trade-off hypothesis on French firms
de La Bruslerie, Hubert; Latrous, Imen - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2012
Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998–2009 is empirically tested. It supports...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708251
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Target shareholder agreements, takeover premiums, and acquisition likelihood
Belot, François - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708260
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Reforming Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Choice between Unitary versus Dual Boards of Directors
Sushka, Marie; Slovin, Myron; Ginglinger, Edith; Belot, … - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2012
Contemporary governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring but recent theoretical models find that a passive board is often optimal. We examine board structure choice in France where for 45 years firms have been free to choose between a unitary board and a dual board...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708539