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Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790025
Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790035
In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the … determine the necessary conditions of the controller's efficiency. The ownership structure and the board of directors rarely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861596
In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. Such agreements are often viewed as means of insulating the firm from the market for corporate control. Specific provisions (namely concerted action, pre-emptive buying rights and repartitioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706570
Controlled firms are in a framework where private benefits create a buffer between public earnings and economic profitability. We focus on debt leverage in the type II agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and outside investors. We use a simple discrete model comparing the capital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707651
minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders is extensive. The efficiency of capital allocation is positively …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707890
Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998–2009 is empirically tested. It supports...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708251
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708260
Contemporary governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring but recent theoretical models find that a passive board is often optimal. We examine board structure choice in France where for 45 years firms have been free to choose between a unitary board and a dual board...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708539
Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010708698