In the theoretical framework of corporate governance this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers. The confrontation of entrenchment theory and agency theory allows to determine the necessary conditions of the...

This paper examines a combined set of corporate governance features that influence disclosure quality in a context of ownership concentration. Agency theory presents a theoretical framework linking disclosure decision to corporate governance mechanisms. Using a Multiple Correspondence Analysis...

This paper aims to examine the effect of many ownership features on firm's disclosure quality using the theoretical framework of the agency theory, which states that investors information demand increases with agency costs of the firm. Public ownership increases agency costs and therefore should...

Face à la montée en puissance des actionnaires individuels et la progression du « capitalisme financier », les entreprises françaises sont amenées à adapter leurs stratégies de communication. Dans son rapport de 1999, la COB a constaté des améliorations dans la qualité de la...

Debt is not frequently analyzed in relation to the conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. At the same time, debt helps to manage the type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...