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Supervision and Project Performance: A Principal-Agent Approach

Chauvet, Lisa; Collier, Paul; Fuster, Andreas - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2013

This paper extends and applies principal-agent theory to the performance of donor projects. There is variation in the … implication of principal-agent theory is that the principal should put greater effort into observation the wider is the divergence … of recipient governments. Consistent with the theory, we find that donor supervision of projects is significantly more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212045

L'économie des contrats : technologies de l'information et coordination interentreprises

Brousseau, Eric - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765449

L’assurance habitation dans les départements d’Outre-mer : une faible souscription

Grislain-Letrémy, Céline; Calvet, Lucie - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2012

Les départements d'Outre-mer (Dom) sont plus exposés aux risques naturels que la France métropolitaine. Pourtant, seuls 52 % des ménages des Dom ont souscrit pour leur résidence principale une assurance habitation, qui inclut obligatoirement la couverture des catastrophes naturelles, alors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011072657

Assurance santé et sélection adverse : L’incidence des maladies invalidantes

Alary, David; Bien, Franck - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2008

This paper investigates the impact of chronic diseases on insurance contracts with adverse selection. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the introduction of chronic diseases influences the equilibrium of insurance market. We characterize conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706637

Nonparametric Adverse Selection Problems

Carlier, Guillaume - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2002

conveniently expressed using some abstract convexity notions arising for instance in Mass Transfer Theory. After this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707036

Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth : Division of Labor and Directed Production

Schnedler, Wendelin; Ratto, Marisa - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2008

How can a manager inﬂuence workers’ activity, while knowing little about it ? This paper examines a situation where production requires several tasks, and the manager wants to direct production to achieve a preferred allocation of effort across tasks. However, the effort that is required for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166496

Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard

Chemla, Gilles; Hennessy, Christopher A. - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2014

What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166577

Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard

Aubert, Cécile - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2006

Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010795028

Assurance maladie et risque moral ex ante. L'incidence du type de risque sanitaire

Bien, Franck - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861615

On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

Chassagnon, Arnold; Attar, Andrea - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2008

We study an economywhere intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. In this context, we show that, contrarily to what is commonly believed, market equilibria may fail to be efﬁcient even if the planner is not allowed to enforce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071873