Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs betweendeveloped and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual propertyrights did not pay much attention to this aspect...

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry inthe final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between thefirms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market alwaysincreases welfare. If the input market is moderately...

We show the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on R&D investmentand social welfare in a duopoly with R&D competition where success in R&D isprobabilistic. We show that R&D investments are higher under Bertrand (Cournot)competition when R&D productivities are sufficiently low (high), and...

It is usually believed that innovation increases profits of the firms and alsosocial welfare. In a duopoly model with product innovation, we show that both thesebelieve may go wrong. We show that if the cost of innovation is not very large,prisoner’s dilemma occurs under product innovation,...

This paper considers welfare effects of entry when the incumbent firmbehaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market. In contrast to previous work(Klemperer, 1988, Journal of Industrial Economics), we show that entry may alwaysincrease welfare. Using general demand function, we show the...

We show the welfare effects of entry in presence of technology licensingunder Cournot competition. If the entrant is technologically inferior to that of theincumbent then, though licensing reduces (or completely eliminates) excessive entryfor relatively low entry costs, it creates excessive...

We consider the effects of product market cooperation on R&Dinvestment, profits, consumer surplus and welfare. We show that though R&Dinvestment, consumer surplus and social welfare may be higher or lower underproduct market cooperation than product market competition, industry profit isalways...

This paper considers the effects of entry in the final goods market when the input market is imperfectly competitive. We show that entry of a new firm may increase profit of the incumbent if the technology of the entrant is sufficiently inferior to that of the incumbent...

We show the effects of entry of a domestic firm and a foreign firm on welfare, in presence of licensing. In case of licensing with up-front fixed-fee, domestic entry increases welfare if the technological differences between the firms are not very large, whereas foreign entry increases welfare...

This paper shows that technology licensing may be socially undesirable. Possibility of licensing increases the incentive for entry and thus, increases competition. If technology of the incumbent and entrant is sufficiently close, licensing-induced entry reduces social welfare. Otherwise,...