In a vertically separated industry, where the input suppliers have significantmarket power, not only entry but also the markets (upstream or downstream) withentry possibilities might be a concern to the policy makers. While ‘entry in thedownstream market only’ always increases welfare,...

This paper examines the validity of alternative assumptions aboutpublic enterprise strategies in the presence of both domestic and internationalcompetition. It extends the quantity-setting game to apreplay stage and endogenizes the firms’ order of moves to show thati) Cournot competition is...

This paper shows that the possibility of licensing can significantly alter theeffects of entry on social welfare. We find that while licensing with output royaltyalways raises welfare due to entry, licensing with up-front fixed-fee reduces thepossibility of lower welfare compared to a situation...

The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance ofmarket power of the input supplier. In this paper we examine the incentive forlicensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry havemarket power. We show that licensing in the downstream industry is...

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a horizontallydifferentiated duopoly market with non-tournament R&D competition. We consider thatsuccess in R&D is uncertain. We show that whether firms invest more under Cournotcompetition or Bertrand competition is ambiguous and depends on...