Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs betweendeveloped and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual propertyrights did not pay much attention to this aspect...

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry inthe final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between thefirms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market alwaysincreases welfare. If the input market is moderately...

We provide a theoretical justification for bi-sourcing, which refers to thesituation where a final goods producer buys an input from an outside supplier and alsoproduces it in-house. Bi-sourcing occurs if the marginal cost of producing the input inhouseis higher than the marginal cost of outside...

In a bilateral oligopoly, Ghosh and Morita (‘Social desirability of freeentry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis, 2007, IJIO) show that entry is always sociallyinsufficient if the upstream agents have sufficiently strong bargaining power. Weshow that this conclusion is very much dependent on the...

Common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of the incumbentfirms. On the contrary, we show that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and theentrants behave like Stackelberg followers, entry may benefit the incumbents who arerelatively cost efficient while it always hurts the cost...

We consider strategic government policies on the exports of final goods andon the input production when the inputs are non-tradable and produced by the foreignfirms. If the policies consist of only per-unit tax/subsidies either on the final goods oron the inputs, it is optimal for the...

Whether higher productivity of the foreign firm increases host countrywelfare depends on whether the reason for foreign direct investment (FDI) is to savethe trade cost or to get the advantage of cheap labor. We show that, if the reason forFDI is to get the advantage of cheap labor, higher...

Considering Cournot competition, this note shows that, if the firms differ inlabor productivities, the equilibrium wage rates under a centralized labor union are notindependent of the number of firms and product differentiation if the labor unioncharges a uniform wage rate. However, if the...

We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...

We show the incentive for divisionalization by a monopolist producer. Incontrast to the previous literature, where divisionalization occurs for product marketadvantage, we show that divisionalization occurs if it provides strategic advantage inthe labor market. With unionized labor market, we...