Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs betweendeveloped and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual propertyrights did not pay much attention to this aspect...

We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...

We show the incentive for divisionalization by a monopolist producer. Incontrast to the previous literature, where divisionalization occurs for product marketadvantage, we show that divisionalization occurs if it provides strategic advantage inthe labor market. With unionized labor market, we...

We show the effect of patent protection on R&D investment in presence of‘inventing around’ (or imitation) and technology licensing...

This paper considers welfare effects of entry when the incumbent firmbehaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market. In contrast to previous work(Klemperer, 1988, Journal of Industrial Economics), we show that entry may alwaysincrease welfare. Using general demand function, we show the...

We show the welfare effects of entry in presence of technology licensingunder Cournot competition. If the entrant is technologically inferior to that of theincumbent then, though licensing reduces (or completely eliminates) excessive entryfor relatively low entry costs, it creates excessive...

We show that a monopolist input supplier licenses its technology to create a second source of input supply if second sourcing increases competition in the final goods market. We also show that welfare increases under second sourcing...

This paper considers the effects of entry in the final goods market when the input market is imperfectly competitive. We show that entry of a new firm may increase profit of the incumbent if the technology of the entrant is sufficiently inferior to that of the incumbent...

We show the effects of entry of a domestic firm and a foreign firm on welfare, in presence of licensing. In case of licensing with up-front fixed-fee, domestic entry increases welfare if the technological differences between the firms are not very large, whereas foreign entry increases welfare...