We consider the effects of product market cooperation on R&Dinvestment, profits, consumer surplus and welfare. We show that though R&Dinvestment, consumer surplus and social welfare may be higher or lower underproduct market cooperation than product market competition, industry profit isalways...

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs betweendeveloped and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual propertyrights did not pay much attention to this aspect...

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry inthe final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between thefirms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market alwaysincreases welfare. If the input market is moderately...

We provide a theoretical justification for bi-sourcing, which refers to thesituation where a final goods producer buys an input from an outside supplier and alsoproduces it in-house. Bi-sourcing occurs if the marginal cost of producing the input inhouseis higher than the marginal cost of outside...

In a bilateral oligopoly, Ghosh and Morita (‘Social desirability of freeentry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis, 2007, IJIO) show that entry is always sociallyinsufficient if the upstream agents have sufficiently strong bargaining power. Weshow that this conclusion is very much dependent on the...

Common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of the incumbentfirms. On the contrary, we show that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and theentrants behave like Stackelberg followers, entry may benefit the incumbents who arerelatively cost efficient while it always hurts the cost...

We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...

We show the incentive for divisionalization by a monopolist producer. Incontrast to the previous literature, where divisionalization occurs for product marketadvantage, we show that divisionalization occurs if it provides strategic advantage inthe labor market. With unionized labor market, we...

An important discussion in recent years is the introduction of product patentsand the abolition of process patents. In a model with endogenous number of innovatingfirms, we show that whether product patent increases R&D is ambiguous, and depends onthe type of market demand and the cost of R&D....

We show the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on R&D investmentand social welfare in a duopoly with R&D competition where success in R&D isprobabilistic. We show that R&D investments are higher under Bertrand (Cournot)competition when R&D productivities are sufficiently low (high), and...