In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry inthe final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between thefirms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market alwaysincreases welfare. If the input market is moderately...

We show the incentive for divisionalization by a monopolist producer. Incontrast to the previous literature, where divisionalization occurs for product marketadvantage, we show that divisionalization occurs if it provides strategic advantage inthe labor market. With unionized labor market, we...

We show the welfare effects of entry in presence of technology licensingunder Cournot competition. If the entrant is technologically inferior to that of theincumbent then, though licensing reduces (or completely eliminates) excessive entryfor relatively low entry costs, it creates excessive...

We show the effects of entry of a domestic firm and a foreign firm on welfare, in presence of licensing. In case of licensing with up-front fixed-fee, domestic entry increases welfare if the technological differences between the firms are not very large, whereas foreign entry increases welfare...

This paper shows that technology licensing may be socially undesirable. Possibility of licensing increases the incentive for entry and thus, increases competition. If technology of the incumbent and entrant is sufficiently close, licensing-induced entry reduces social welfare. Otherwise,...

In a vertically separated industry, where the input suppliers have significantmarket power, not only entry but also the markets (upstream or downstream) withentry possibilities might be a concern to the policy makers. While ‘entry in thedownstream market only’ always increases welfare,...

This paper shows that the possibility of licensing can significantly alter theeffects of entry on social welfare. We find that while licensing with output royaltyalways raises welfare due to entry, licensing with up-front fixed-fee reduces thepossibility of lower welfare compared to a situation...

Significant amount of vertical technology transfer occurs betweendeveloped and developing country firms, yet the literature on intellectual propertyrights did not pay much attention to this aspect...

We provide a theoretical justification for bi-sourcing, which refers to thesituation where a final goods producer buys an input from an outside supplier and alsoproduces it in-house. Bi-sourcing occurs if the marginal cost of producing the input inhouseis higher than the marginal cost of outside...

In a bilateral oligopoly, Ghosh and Morita (‘Social desirability of freeentry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis, 2007, IJIO) show that entry is always sociallyinsufficient if the upstream agents have sufficiently strong bargaining power. Weshow that this conclusion is very much dependent on the...