We provide a theoretical justification for bi-sourcing, which refers to thesituation where a final goods producer buys an input from an outside supplier and alsoproduces it in-house. Bi-sourcing occurs if the marginal cost of producing the input inhouseis higher than the marginal cost of outside...

Common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of the incumbentfirms. On the contrary, we show that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and theentrants behave like Stackelberg followers, entry may benefit the incumbents who arerelatively cost efficient while it always hurts the cost...

We show that, for licensing by an outside innovator in a Cournot oligopoly,royalty licensing can generate higher payoff to the innovator than the fixed-feelicensing and auction if the labor market is unionized...

We show the incentive for divisionalization by a monopolist producer. Incontrast to the previous literature, where divisionalization occurs for product marketadvantage, we show that divisionalization occurs if it provides strategic advantage inthe labor market. With unionized labor market, we...

An important discussion in recent years is the introduction of product patentsand the abolition of process patents. In a model with endogenous number of innovatingfirms, we show that whether product patent increases R&D is ambiguous, and depends onthe type of market demand and the cost of R&D....

We show the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on R&D investmentand social welfare in a duopoly with R&D competition where success in R&D isprobabilistic. We show that R&D investments are higher under Bertrand (Cournot)competition when R&D productivities are sufficiently low (high), and...

This paper considers welfare effects of entry when the incumbent firmbehaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market. In contrast to previous work(Klemperer, 1988, Journal of Industrial Economics), we show that entry may alwaysincrease welfare. Using general demand function, we show the...

We show the welfare effects of entry in presence of technology licensingunder Cournot competition. If the entrant is technologically inferior to that of theincumbent then, though licensing reduces (or completely eliminates) excessive entryfor relatively low entry costs, it creates excessive...

We show that a monopolist input supplier licenses its technology to create a second source of input supply if second sourcing increases competition in the final goods market. We also show that welfare increases under second sourcing...

This paper considers the effects of entry in the final goods market when the input market is imperfectly competitive. We show that entry of a new firm may increase profit of the incumbent if the technology of the entrant is sufficiently inferior to that of the incumbent...