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Bougheas, Spiros; Saksit Thananittayaudom - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

We examine a Stackelberg game where a financially constrainedleader faces competition from a ‘deep pocket’ follower. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868761

BERTRAND AND COURNOT COMPETITIONS IN ADYNAMIC GAME

Mukherjee, Arijit - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2003

-tournament R&D competition. We consider thatsuccess in R&D is uncertain. We show that whether firms invest more under … Cournotcompetition or Bertrand competition is ambiguous and depends on the probability ofsuccess in R&D but does not depend on the degree … of product differentiation. While‘static’ welfare is higher under Bertrand competition, we find that ‘dynamic’ welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868906

WELFARE EFFECTS OF ENTRY: THE IMPACT OFLICENSING

Mukherjee, Arijit; Mukherjee, Soma - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2003

competition policy... …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868907

DISGUISED AGGREGATIVE GAMES

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2001

Noncooperative games in which each player’s payo¤ function depends on anadditively separable function of every player’s choice variable may be transformedinto an aggregative game, which may be analysed using the conceptof ‘share functions’. The resulting approach avoids the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868958

ASYMMETRIC CONTESTS WITH GENERALTECHNOLOGIES

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; …

We investigate the Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectlydiscriminating contests, focussing on existence, uniqueness and rentdissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a productionfunction with decreasing returns for each contestant, equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868959

RENTSEEKING BY PLAYERS WITH CONSTANTABSOLUTE RISK AVERSION

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2000

The rent-seeking model of Tullock (1980) has stimulated a large literature on rent-seekingcontests, of which Hillman (1989) and Nitzan (1994) provide useful surveys. AlthoughTullock's 'winner take all' model has been adapted and extended in numerous ways, thereremain fundamental modeling issues,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005869062

WEAK LINKS, GOOD SHOTS AND OTHER PUBLICGOOD GAMES: BUILDING ON BBV

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2006

We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom-Blume-Varian model of non-cooperative voluntary contributions to a public goodthat avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is in-creased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868656

THE GEOMETRY OF AGGREGATIVE GAMES

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

We study aggregative games in which players’ strategy sets areconvex intervals of the real line and (not necessarily differentiable)payoffs depend only on a player’s own strategy and the sum of allplayers’ strategies. We give sufficient conditions on each player’s payofffunction to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868768

EVOLUTION IN SYMMETRIC INCOMPLETEINFORMATION GAMES

Amann, Erwin; Possajennikov, Alex - Universität <Duisburg; University <Nottingham> / … - 2004

The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric twoplayergames with incomplete information. One model postulates thatthe type of a player is fixed, and evolution works within types. Inthe other model type-contingent strategies evolve. In the case of twotypes and two strategies it is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868794

EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF CONSTANTCONSISTENT CONJECTURES

Possajennikov, Alex - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2004

The paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant)consistent conjectures in a given game and evolutionary stabilityof conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent andconsistent conjectures are the only interior candidates for evolutionarystability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868802